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Abstract: The paper deals with the security of interoperable heterogeneous database environments. It 
contains a general discussion of the issues involved as well as a description of our experiences gained 
during the development and implementation of the security module of IRO-DB - an European ESPRIT III 
funded project with the goal to develop interoperable access between relational and object-oriented 
databases.  
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Security in homogeneous database systems has been an issue for several years now. Various techniques 
have been proposed addressing the general security requirements confidentiality (protecting information 
from unauthorized access), integrity (protecting information against malicious or accidental modification), 
and availability (to serve authorized users whenever requested).  
To achieve interoperability between existing heterogeneous databases (component databases, CDBS) a 
database federation (federated database system, FDBS) may be built. In comparison to the centralized 
approach a FDBS provides two main advantages: First, it provides users with the capability to retrieve data 
located at different heterogeneous databases by using a single database interface and second it provides 
companies a means to integrate existing data from different sources within a global view. Interoperability is 
a significant advantage but it also increases the need for protecting the security of CDBSs and their local 
users dramatically. Most existing mechanisms ensuring security requirements have to provide new 
functionality when applied to FDBSs. In particular, we see the following requirements:  
• Identification and authentication: The federation might wish to authenticate the local sites to 
which a connection for global users should be established. In turn, each local site might wish to 
authenticate the federation site to which it should offer its local data. Additionally, the various 
CDBSs might wish to identify and authenticate global users at their local sites, respectively. 
Mechanisms have to be provided to relieve the authentication process for global users in order to 
prevent them from multiply typing in authentication information (for example, passwords).  
• Authorization and access controls: Security subjects (users, roles, etc.), access types (read, write, 
method calls, etc.), and security objects (classes, instances, etc.) may be heterogeneous in 
granularity among the CDBSs constituting a federation. A FDBS has to provide a level of 
granularity which allows to identify and integrate the various local concepts. Furthermore, 
authorization techniques as well as the administration of authorizations might differ significantly 
in CDBSs. A powerful data model combined with a powerful security model has to be provided by 
the FDBS in order to specify a global security policy and to overcome the heterogeneity issues 
mentioned above.  
• Integrity and consistency constraints: The data model of the FDBS has to provide means to specify 
multi-site integrity and consistency constraints since the data offered by the federation may be 
scattered over various local sites as well as copied from one site to another site.  
• Auditing: Security auditing like identification and authentication has to be performed at the 
federation site as well as at the various local sites. Additional audit records have to be provided if 
control passes from the global layer of the federation to a particular CDBS at the local layer.  
• 
Figure 1: Elements of the FADAC security model (in OMT notation)  
Within the ESPRIT III project IRO-DB (interoperable relational and object-oriented databases) we 
designed and implemented a security concept for IRO-DB. The system uses (see Gardarin et al., 1994) a 
three layered architecture having a local, a communication, and an interoperable layer. An object-oriented 
data model (ODMG) is used to provide interoperability among relational and object-oriented databases. All 
CDBSs at the local layer of IRO-DB have to implement a local database adapter (LDA) which makes the 
local system appear as if it was an ODMG compliant database. Local ODMG schemata are exported over 
the communication layer and imported at the interoperable layer where federated views on the exported 
data may be defined. In analogy to the extended ODMG data model, a powerful security model has been 
designed and is used throughout the layers of IRO-DB. The model characterized as federated, 
administrative, discretionary access controls (FADAC, see Eßmayr et al. 1995, 1996a, and 1996b) can be 
summarized as follows:  
• Discretionary access controls: Each security object (i.e. a class) is owned by the creator of the 
object (i.e. a user or a role). The owners have unrestricted access to security objects but are not 
allowed to grant authorizations to other users because in database federations it seems to be 
dangerous to leave security administration in the hand of a possibly large number of users 
distributed over several CDBSs.  
• Administrative: In IRO-DB delegation of authorizations is centralized to administrative authorities 
and not decentralized in the hand of distributed users. FADAC uses role-based access controls 
(RBAC, compare Sandhu and Coyne, 1996) requiring users to play different roles in order to 
access different data. Some of the roles could have administrative rights in order to administrate 
security. Following the administration paradigm intends to prevent the known problems of 
cascading and cyclic authorizations and addresses the need to administer security issues properly 
in a federation of many CDBSs. Combining the administration paradigm with discretionary access 
controls tries to preserve flexibility and prevents the case that security subjects initially have no 
access to security objects they just have created.  
• Federated: Mapping between local and global security concepts is provided in a way that each 
LDA makes its local security information appear as if it was FADAC compliant. The local 
security information is exported over the communication layer and imported at the interoperable 
layer where global security subjects may be defined as mappings to various local subjects and 
global authorization rules may be specified. In order to enforce elaborated security policies 
FADAC provides powerful access control concepts at the interoperable layer including positive, 
negative, as well as implied authorizations with the aim to ensure consistency between global and 
local authorization states.  
FADAC consists of several elements which can be illustrated together with their relationships as shown in 
Figure 1.  
Roles are regarded as obligations and duties describing what has to be done regardless of who does it. Each 
role should be authorized for exactly those accesses that are needed to fulfill the duties of the job (principle 
of least privilege). A role hierarchy can be designed using the sub-role relationship which may reflect the 
organizational and functional structure of a company. Users are the existing persons of the system and need 
to play a role in order to access data. They can choose among several roles they are a member-of but may 
only play one role at a time. This policy prevents authorization conflicts among the roles of a user and it 
seems to be no limitation to real-life situations as long as users can easily change the role they need to play. 
The security objects of IRO-DB are classes which may, according to ODMG, be structured with general 
relationships (related-class), within a class hierarchy (sub-class) and a class composition hierarchy (comp-
class). Authorizations may also be granted to higher level security objects (i.e. schema, database or 
federation) which in fact represent authorizations for sets of classes. A role may be authorized-to access a 
class with either one of the elementary access types, i.e. read, write, create or delete (covering relational 
CDBSs), with executing a method (covering object-oriented CDBSs), or, finally, as the owner of a class 
which is the most powerful authorization type and implies all other possible accesses for that class. Content 
dependent authorizations are realized in making use of the concept of mappings at the interoperable layer, 
which are an IRO-DB extension to ODMG. Mappings are primarily used to integrate different local import 
schemata into an interoperable schema. Since a mapping is a class which determines its instances by 
executing a query, it can be used to provide view-based protection allowing for any predicate that can be 
expressed within a query. Furthermore, method authorizations can be used to realize specific kinds of 
predicates, if needed. Global subjects (users and roles) also have to be mapped to corresponding local 
subjects, one for each CDBSs, in order to be able to access local data. A global request must then suffice 
the global security policy, checked for the global subject at the interoperable layer, and must not violate any 
of the local security policies, checked for the corresponding local subjects at the local layer by each of the 
engaged LDAs. This architecture ensures the security needs of local sites since it enables them to specify 
the roles and users that should be exported to the federation. Furthermore, it guarantees the security policies 
of each local site participating in the federation and allows to specify additional restrictions at the 
federation site to govern unauthorized aggregation and inference of local data.  
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